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Strange Economics of Land Use Law:
From Euclid to Euclid
RONALD S. COPE*

INTRODUCTION

It is remarkable that the patriarch of zoning cases, Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,' is approaching its seventieth year, and that the
arguments raised in that case, long since thought settled by an army of its
progeny, are still cavorting as youthfully as ever, inspired by lawyers who

seek a scientific basis for legal opinions. The use of economic principles
to justify legal conclusions or to criticize the thinking of jurists not as well
versed in the science of economics is the Geritol which has imbued new life
2
into rather tired arguments. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
4
3
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, and Dolan v. City of Tigard,
have, for their part, served as inspiration for contemporary legal scholars to
rethink in almost revolutionary terms concepts thought to be settled long
ago.

It may come as something of a shock to those who have not read
Euclid in some time that the arguments presented then have much the same
shape as arguments appearing now in scholarly journals critiquing the
Supreme Court's more modern forays into land use regulation. For
example, counsel for the plaintiff property owner in Euclid argued:
Since the industrial development of a great city will
go on, the effect of this attempted action necessarily is to
divert industry to other less suited sites, with a consequent
rise in value thereof; so that the loss sustained by the
proprietors of land who cannot so use their land is gained
by proprietors of land elsewhere. In other words, the
property, or value, which is taken away from one set of
people, is, by this law, bestowed upon another set of
* A.B., J.D., University of Chicago; Partner, Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Cope & Bush,
P.C., Chicago.
1. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
3. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
4. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
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people, imposing an uncompensated loss on the one hand
and a gain which is arbitrary and unnatural on the other
hand, since it results, not from the operation of economic
laws, but from arbitrary considerations of taste enacted
into hard and fast legislation. Such legislation also tends
to monopolize business and factory sites.5
This argument might well have been taken from one of several contemporary law review articles dealing with law and economics.
So too, if one refers to the "bundle of rights" argument of Justice Scalia
in Lucas6 and tries to determine what are "reasonable investment-backed
expectations 7 ("RIBE"), one is surprised to learn that in 1926, an advocate
for a property owner would state:
Quite different is the police power under which the
ordinance in this case purports to be passed. In every
ordered society the State must act as umpire to the extent
of preventing one man from so using his property or
rights as to prevent others from making a correspondingly
full and free use of their property and rights. The abstract
right of a man to build a fire trap is limited by the rights
of other people not to have their houses subjected to the
peril created by it....
* But I always know when I buy land, that I may
not devote it to uses which endanger the safety, health, or
morals of others or make its use a common nuisance to
the prejudice of the public welfare.8
No doubt, in the shifting sands of the South Carolina beachfront
property which Lucas purchased there lies the question which the United
States Supreme Court referred back to the state court to resolve as to what
was really in that "bundle of rights."
It is clear, however, that whether one is looking at the ultimate
transaction costs to the property owner in the context of government
regulatory power, or one is looking to the "inherent" property rights of the
individual property owner in the guise of RIBE, the arguments are still made
of the same cloth, with only the tailoring altered to satisfy today's fashions.

5. 272 U.S. at 371.
6. 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
7. Id. at 2903.
8. Argument for Appellee at 375, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926) (No. 31).
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I. LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL:
WHOSE THEORY MAKES IT A TAKING?

If a governmental body seeks to acquire land for the purpose of
constructing a road, there is no need to engage in an analysis of "what is a
taking?" The procedure is relatively straight forward in that the governmental body purchases the land based upon an agreed amount or pays a sum
determined by a judge or jury after a trial. In the field of "regulatory takings," the issues are not so clear. Where a zoning ordinance required choice
residential land to be used as open space,9 or where a state legislature required that coal companies not mine fifty percent of the coal beneath certain
structures in order to maintain surface support,10 or where property was
designated a landmark and the city refused to allow the property owner to
construct a fifty-five-story office building on the site,"1 or where a municipality passed a law requiring a landlord to permit the installation of
television cable lines on its property,' 2 the Supreme Court was confronted
with takings questions which helped form the background for Lucas.
Although Lucas 3 is by now well worn, it is useful to restate a few of
the salient facts. In 1977, the South Carolina legislature enacted the Coastal
Zone Management Act, which
required owners of coastal zone land that qualified as "a
critical area" defined in the legislation to include beaches
and immediately adjacent sand dunes, to obtain a permit
from the newly created South Carolina Coastal Council.
. . prior to committing to a "use other than the use the
critical area was devoted to on [September 28, 1977]."'"
The purpose of the Act was to prevent or significantly reduce "'threats to
life and destruction of property by eliminating development and redevelopment in high hazard areas.""'
Lucas, the plaintiff, was a contractor and part owner of a development
in an area known as the Isle of Palms. In December 1986, he purchased
two of the last four pieces of vacant property in the Isle of Palms development. These were beach front properties and, at the time he purchased
9.
10.
It.
12.
13.
14.
15.

1988)).

See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
Id. at 2889 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2904 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1456b(a)(2) (Supp. II
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them, they were not part of the "critical area" under the 1977 Act. 6 He
paid $975,000 for the lots and intended to develop them with single-family
homes. Before he could begin construction, however, South Carolina
enacted the Beach Front Management Act in 1988, which enlarged those
areas designated as "critical areas" to include the distance from the mean
high water mark to a setback line established on the basis of "the best
scientific and historical data" available.17 The new "critical area" now
encompassed Lucas's lots, and he was foreclosed from being able to build
the two houses.
Lucas filed suit claiming a taking of his property without just compensation." The trial court agreed, determining that "'at the time Lucas purchased
the two lots, both were zoned for single-family residential construction
and.., there were no restrictions imposed upon such use of the property ...."19As a result of the actions of the Carolina Coastal Council, the trial
court awarded Lucas "just compensation" of $1,232,387.50.0
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court's award of
compensation, basing its conclusion upon the finding that the South Carolina
legislature had demonstrated "'that the Beachfront Management Act [was]
properly and validly designed to preserve ...South Carolina's beaches"' 2
and that "new construction in the coastal zone--such as petitioner intended-threatened this public resource. '22 The South Carolina court then further
determined that "when a regulation respecting the use of property is
designed 'to prevent serious public harm,' no compensation is owing under
the Takings Clause regardless of the regulation's effect on the property's
23
value. ,
The United States Supreme Court took the case and reversed the
judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court, concluding that when a
regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land, a
taking has occurred which requires the payment of just compensation.24

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
1991)).
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 2889.
Id. at 2905.
Id. at 2890.
Id. (quoting Application to Petition for Cert. at 36).
Id.
Id. (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C.
Id. (quoting Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 898).
Id. (quoting Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899).
Id. at 2901.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF TAKINGS,
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, AND LUCAS

In order to understand Lucas, it is necessary to place it "in the context
of the larger philosophical debates over the social function of private
property." 25 As Professor Richard A. Epstein has said:

On the one hand, private property has often been praised
as the bulwark of individual liberty, to be held sacred and
inviolate against any and all intrusions .... On the other
hand, private property has been attacked as the mark of
special privilege--indeed theft--that26allows the lucky few
to dominate the unfortunate many.
While these two views are not explicitly expressed in the majority opinion
in Lucas, or in Justices Blackmun's and Stevens' dissenting opinions,
nevertheless, the polarity between the need to regulate for the common good
and the "inherent rights" of a property owner to the "bundle of rights"
acquired when title to property is obtained is clearly present.
It is unlikely that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause originally
Scholars
extended to the regulation of property, whatever the effect."
have noted, "Until the end of the 19th Century . ..jurists held that the
Constitution protected possession only, and not value. ' 28 When the courts
began to consider the regulation of property as being a taking, they still continued to uphold bans on particular uses without paying compensation,
notwithstanding the economic impact. 29 This was under the rationale that
no one obtained a vested right to injure or endanger the public.3" For
example, in Coates v. City of New York, 3 New York's highest court found
no taking in New York's ban on the internment of the dead within the city,

25. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection,SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1 (1987).
26. Id.
27. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 66-68 (1973).

28. Steven A. Siegel, Understandingthe 19th Century Contract Clause: The Role of
the Property-Privilege Distinction and 'Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.

1, 76 (1986).
29. This was part of the natural evolution of the law of nuisance but also something
more--a recognition that planning a city's growth helped prevent "the congestion, disorder
and dangers which often inhere in unregulated municipal development." City of Aurora v.
Bums, 148 N.E. 784 (1925).
30. See PATRICK J.ROHAN, ZONING & LAND USE CONTROLS, § 52A.02(4)(a)
("[R]egulations designed to prevent public harm have been considered exercises of the police
power, which are not compensable acts.").
31. 7 Cow. 585, (N.Y. 1827).
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although "no other use can be made of these lands. 3 2 The ban was held
to be a constitutional exercise of the police power authority to control
nuisances. In the case of Mugler v. State of Kansas,33 a Kansas distiller
who had built a brewery while it was legal to do so challenged a Kansas
constitutional amendment which prohibited the manufacture and sale of
intoxicating liquors. Although the court recognized that the building and
machinery constituting these breweries were of little value because of the
amendment, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Harlan, explained:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to
the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in
any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of
property.... The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as will be
prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the
public, is not--and, consistently with the existence and
safety of organized society, cannot be--burdened with the
condition that the State must compensate such individual
owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason
of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their
property, to inflict injury upon the community.'
The Court makes clear that it recognizes that "all property in this
country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall
not be injurious to the community,"35 and the Takings Clause did not
transform that principle to one that requires compensation whenever the
State asserts its power to enforce it. The Court, however, also makes clear
that it is necessary to weigh the private and'public interests involved in the
legislation.36
In contrast is the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.37 This
case involved a review of the Kohler Act passed by Pennsylvania in 1921,
which provided that it was unlawful to mine anthracite coal so as to cause
the caving in, collapse, or subsidence of a wide variety of structures,
including public buildings, bridges, churches, schools, and the like, in
addition to "any structure used as a human habitation," or any factory, store
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 592.
123 U.S. 623 (1887).
Id. at 668-69.
Id. at 665 (quoting Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 32 (1877).
Id. at 668-69.
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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or other industrial or mercantile establishment.38 The effect of these
restrictions was to "destroy previously existing rights of property and
contract" in the mining of minerals. 39 The mine owners were deprived of
their previously purchased contract rights to mine anywhere under the
surface without any monetary compensation.' In holding the Act unconstitutional, Justice Holmes stated the following:
The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment
presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides
that it shall not be taken for such use without compensation. . . . When this seemingly absolute protection is
found to be qualified by the police power, the natural
tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification
more and more until at last private property disappears.
But that cannot be accomplished in this way under the
Constitution of the United States.
The general rule at least is that while property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far
it will be recognized as a taking. It may be doubted how
far exceptional cases, like the blowing up of a house to
stop a conflagration, go--and if they go beyond the
general rule, whether they do not stand as much upon
tradition as upon principle. . . . We are in danger of
forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by
a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change. As we already have said this is a question of
degree--and therefore cannot be disposed of by general
propositions."
This tension between the views expressed in Mugler and Mahon
continues to the present.

38. Id. at 412-13.
39. Id. at 413.
40. Id.

41. Id. at 415-16.
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III. KEYSTONE BITUMINOUS COAL Ass'N V. DEBENEDICTIS; FIRST ENGLISH
EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH OF GLENDALE V. COUNTY OF
LOS ANGELES; NOLLAN V. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION:
THREE MUSES AS HARBINGERS OF LUCAS

The term "inverse condemnation" refers to a claim by a landowner
which arises when a public agency has adopted a regulation which substantially limits the use of the landowner's property.42 The taking or the
condemnation is in the rezoning which restricts the use of property from
what was formerly permitted. In Keystone,43 First English,44 and Nollan,45 an action for "inverse condemnation" was the vehicle by which the
United States Supreme Court once again considered the issues which had
been raised in Mugler and Mahon. These three cases provide the backdrop
for the decision in Lucas.
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,46 the Court
considered a challenge by certain coal companies of the Pennsylvania
Subsistence Act, which required that fifty percent of the coal beneath certain
structures be kept in place to provide surface support. This Act was almost
identical in all respects with the Kohler Act, which had been held invalid in
Mahon. However, this time around, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the legislation, pointing out that the plaintiffs had failed to show any
deprivation significant enough to satisfy "the heavy burden placed upon one
alleging a regulatory taking."47 The Court held that there was no actual
proof of diminution in value presented by the plaintiffs. 8 The Court,
however, reiterated the following standard: "The test to be applied in
considering the facial challenge is fairly straightforward. A statute
regulating the uses that can be made of' property effects a taking if it 'denies
an owner economically viable use of his land.' ,,4
The Court further adds the following in regard to the plaintiffs burden
of proof:

42. "The phrase 'inverse condemnation' appears to be one that was coined simply as
a shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for
a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted." United
States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
43. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
44. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304 (1987).
45. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
46. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
47. Id. at 493.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 495 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
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The hill is made especially steep because petitioners
here have not claimed, at this stage, that the Act makes it
commercially impracticable for them to continue mining
their bituminous coal interests in western Pennsylvania.
Indeed, petitioners have not even pointed to a single mine
that can no longer be mined for profit.5 0
The interesting point to analyze here is how the Court construes the
"property." In Mahon, the Supreme Court, in Justice Holmes' opinion,
looked at the conveyance of the mineral rights as including a separate
property interest which was paid for by the property owners to mine coal,
even under the surface where structures might be located."1 In Keystone,
the United States Supreme Court looked at the coal mining operation as a
whole and determined whether it was still "profitable," even where a
substantial portion of the coal must still remain in place under the Act. 2
This defining of the property interest at issue is critical to the outcome of
the case.
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County
of Los Angeles, s3 the Court held that under the Just Compensation Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, a property owner is entitled to compensation even
for a "temporary taking" under a regulatory ordinance.54 In that case, the
Court was referring to the time period between the enactment of the
regulation until such time as a determination was made by a court that the
regulation did, in fact, constitute a taking.55 Prior to First English, the
California courts had held that the only remedy was by way of nonmonetary relief, such as an injunction against the enforcement of the regulation.56 If the ordinance was found invalid, that ended the issue, since the
owner could now use the property as he desired. 7 The taking ceased.
Under First English, it is now possible to have a damage award from the

50. Id. at 495-96.
51. 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
52. 480 U.S. at 498; see also Ronald S. Cope, ZONING HANDBOOK FOR MUNICIPAL
OFFICiALS WiTH SUGGESTED FORMs 31-32 (1994).
53. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
54. Id. at 322.
55. Id. at 318-22.
56. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 30 (1979), affid 447 U.S. 255
(1980). "'Invalidation, rather than forced compensation, would seem to be the more expedient
means of remedying legislative excesses."' (quoting John N. Fulham & Stephen Scharf,
Inverse Condemnation:Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance,
26 STAN. L. REv. 1439, 1450-51 (1974).
57. Id. at 30.
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time the regulation effects the taking until a decision on the validity of the

restriction."

In First English, the Court considered an ordinance of the County of
Los Angeles that prohibited construction within a flood protection area.59
The plaintiff's property was located in an area which had been subject to
serious flooding, which had destroyed all of the buildings on the plaintiff's
property.' The Church had operated a campground known as "Luther
61
Glen" as a retreat center and a recreation area for handicapped children.
The County of Los Angeles determined that because of the flood hazard, the
ordinance was "'required for the immediate preservation of the public health
and safety ...."'62 It is important to note that the Supreme Court did not
deal with the validity of the regulation as measured against the deprivation
of value, as was the case in Keystone. Rather, the majority of the Court focused only on the narrow question of whether the plaintiff would be entitled
to damages from the time that the ordinance was enacted until such time as
a court ultimately ruled on the validity of the ordinance. 63 The Court
stated:
We accordingly have no occasion to decide whether the
ordinance at issue actually denied appellant all use of its
property or whether the county might avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by establishing that the denial of all use was insulated as a part of a
State's authority to enact safety regulations.'
In point of fact, the matter was referred back to the state courts and
upon remand, the California Appellate Court determined that the regulation
did not deny the plaintiff all use of its property and did not amount to a
taking.65
Finally, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,6 the Court dealt
with a situation where the California Coastal Commission would only grant
permission to the plaintiffs to rebuild their house on condition that they
convey a public easement across a portion of their beachfront property. The
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
258 Cal.

482 U.S. at 318-22.
Id. at 307.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting App. to Juris. Statement at A32).
Id. at 318-22.
Id. at 313.
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
Rptr. 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).

66. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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majority of the Court determined that "where governmental action results in
'[a] permanent physical occupation' of the property, by the government
itself or by others . . . 'our cases uniformly have found a taking to the
extent of the occupation without regard to whether the action achieves an
important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the
owner' . . . .67 The Court then concluded that a "permanent physical
occupation" occurred for purposes of that rule where the public was given
a permanent and continuous right to travel over the plaintiff's property."
The Court, however, also made an important point in comparing conditions
for the use of land with an outright taking of land. 9 It points out that if
the condition is related to the purpose of the construction, then such a taking
may be non-compensable. 70 The Court states:
Thus, if the Commission attached to the permit some
condition that would have protected the public's ability to
see the beach notwithstanding construction of the new
house--for example, a height limitation, a width restriction, or a ban on fences--so long as the Commission could
have exercised its police power (as we have assumed it
could) to forbid construction of the house altogether,
imposition of the condition would also be constitutional.7'
IV. LUCAS: A VICTORY FOR JUSTICE HOLMES OR
DID ANYTHING REALLY CHANGE?
The themes played out in Mugler and Mahon are replayed in Lucas
after refinement and development in Keystone, First English, and Nollan.
While Keystone seems a throwback to Mugler, and First English carefully
limits the scope of its impact, and Nollan can be viewed as a physical taking
for possession case, the exact placement of Lucas is something of a puzzle.
On the one hand, it can well be contended that Justice Scalia is marching
arm in arm with Justice Holmes and principles expressed by Holmes in the
Mahon case. On the other hand, it is clear that the Court has also ventured

67. Id.
419 (1982)).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.

at 831-32 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
at 832.
at 834-36.
at 836.
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off into new waters which loosen the underpinnings of Mugler and 7invoke,
2
expectations.9
at best, an ambiguous concept of "investment-backed
The Court acknowledges that "many of our prior opinions have
suggested that 'harmful or noxious uses' of property may be proscribed by
a
government regulation without the requirement of compensation.""
However, the Court goes on to advise:
The transition from our early focus on control of
"9noxious" uses to our contemporary understanding of the
broad realm within which government may regulate
without compensation was an easy one, since the distinction between "harm preventing" and "benefit-conferring"
regulation is often in the eye of the beholder. It is quite
possible, for example, to describe in either fashion the
ecological, economic, and aesthetic concerns that inspired
the South Carolina legislature in the present case. One
could say that imposing a servitude on Lucas's land is
necessary in order to prevent his use of it from "harming"
South Carolina's ecological resources; or, instead, in order
to achieve the "benefits" of an ecological preserve.7 4
The Court then goes on to state:
It seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects
the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to
time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in
the legitimate exercise of its police powers; "[a]s long
recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied
limitation and must yield to the police power." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S., at 413, 43 S. Ct. at
159. And in the case of personal property, by reason of
the State's traditionally high degree of control over
commercial dealings, he ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render his property
72. The Court in Lucas stated:
Such an owner might not be able to claim the benefit of our categorical
formulation, but, as we have acknowledged time and time again, "[t]he
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and... the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations" are keenly relevant to takings analysis generally.

112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 n.8. (1992).
73. Id. at 2897.
74. Id. at 2897-98.
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economically worthless (at least if the property's only
economically productive use is sale or manufacture for
sale (see Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 100 S. Ct. 318,
62 L. Ed. 210 (1979) (prohibition on sale of eagle
feathers)). In the case of land, however, we think the
notion pressed by the Council that title is somehow held
subject to the "implied limitation" that the State may
subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is
inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the
Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional
culture. 05
The interjection of this concept of RIBE must imply that investment
backed-expectations do not include the kind of loss envisioned in Mugler.
First, the Court advises that there are at least two categories of regulatory
action that are compensable:
The first encompasses regulations that compel the property owner to suffer a physical "invasion" of his property.
In general (at least with regard to permanent invasions),
no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how
weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required
compensation. For example, in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164,
73 L. Ed. 2d 868 (1982), we determined that New York's
law requiring landlords to allow television cable companies to emplace cable facilities in their apartment buildings constituted a taking, id. at 435-440, 102 S.Ct., at
3175-3178, even though the facilities occupied at most
6
only lV2 cubic feet of the landlord's property.
The second situation identified by the Court which is compensable is
"where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
land."07 Quoting Agins, the Court stated, "As we have said on numerous
occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regulation 'does
not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land.' 01

75. Id. at 2899-900.
76. Id. at 2893.
77. Id.

78. Id. at 2893-94 (citation omitted).
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The Court explains the rationale for compensation in these situations
as follows:
On the other side of the balance, affirmatively
supporting a compensation requirement, is the fact that
regulations that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or productive options for its use--typically,
as here, by requiring land to be left substantially in its
natural state--carry with them a heightened risk that
private property is being pressed into some form of public
service under the guise of mitigating serious public
harm.79

The Court then goes on to quote Justice Brennan, who stated in an
earlier opinion: "From the government's point of view, the benefits flowing
to the public from preservation of open space through regulation may be
equally great as from creating a wildlife refuge through formal condemnation or increasing electricity production through a dam project that floods
private property."80
The Court then analyzes the facts presented in the Lucas case and
reaches the conclusion that here, at least, there appears to be a classic
regulatory taking which should be compensable.
V. INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS, ALL ECONOMICALLY VIABLE
USES: UNRESOLVED POLEMICS

Lucas makes clear that the "noxious use logic" cannot serve to
distinguish regulatory takings which require compensation from regulatory
deprivations that do not require compensation, at least insofar as that
distinction is used to justify a "total regulatory taking."'" Such a taking
must be compensated. There is no clear justification for this rule, but
Justice Scalia suggests that it may simply be "that total deprivation of
landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a
beneficial use is, from 8the
2
physical appropriation.o
Professor Epstein, in commenting upon the Lucas case, raises several
issues, one of which is extremely critical to the law of zoning. First, he
makes the observation that Justice Scalia's use of the idea of reasonable
79. Id. at 2894-95.
80. Id.at 2895 (quoting San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 450 U.S. at 621, 651 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 2899.
82. Id. at 2894.
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investment-backed expectations has inherent limitations which may even be
misleading in interpreting the Takings Clause. 83 As Professor Epstein
points out, if the term is intended to convey the idea that property is
protected only where it has been acquired by purchase or labor, its use is
inaccurate since the government has no more right to take property from a
donee than it can take it from a buyer. While not thwarting expectations,
whether reasonable or investment backed, has long been a function of the
common law, defining "reasonable expectations" for Professor Epstein "turns
on a much more complicated inquiry."" He states the following:
Democratic institutions are organized for instrumental
reasons, the most important of which is to maximize the
welfare of the citizens they govern. Therefore, the
relevant question at every point should be: Does the
regulation or restriction serve to maximize social welfare?
If, by our choice of regulation, we can make one person
better off while leaving no person worse off, then efficiency counsels us to adopt that particular strategy. 6
Professor Epstein is also troubled by the distinction between total and
partial taking. He points out that this distinction does not exist in the
private law of restrictive covenants and asks why the understanding of
reasonable expectations should "shift so dramatically when we move into the
public sphere."87 He then points out that "this wholly artificial distinction"
came into being in order "to avoid having to attack all zoning" since, as he
states, "zoning is, quite simply, a system of partial restrictions on land use,
which would be routinely subject to intense constitutional scrutiny if the
total/partial distinction in Lucas is abandoned.""8
He is quite right, for zoning laws would be under constant attack based
on every fluctuation in the real estate market and by the fact that limitation
of use is implicit to zoning. This was recognized in Euclid, where the value
of the property there was reduced an estimated seventy-five percent.8 9

83. Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of
Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1369, 1370 (1993).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1320.
86. Id. at 1371.
87. Id. at 1388.
88. Id.
89. 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (estimating a decrease of $10,000 per acre to no more
than $2500 per acre as a result of implementing the land use restriction in question).
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Justice Schaffer of the Illinois Supreme Court, commenting on land value
in a typical zoning case, made clear the following:
The fact that, as plaintiffs building consultant testified,
and as defendant concedes, the property in question may
be more valuable if zoned for commercial use than for
apartments is not decisive.... This fact exists in nearly
every case where the intensity with which property may
be used is restrained by zoning laws. The extent to which
property values are changed by a zoning ordinance is, of
course, a proper consideration in determining its validity,
but the profit accruing to individual property owners if
zoning restrictions were removed must always be weighed
against the detriment to the public welfare resulting from
such action. 9
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in Lucas, points out that
expectations are not simply to be ultimately determined by reference to the
State's nuisance law. Justice Kennedy states:
I agree with the Court that nuisance prevention accords
with the most common expectations of property owners
who face regulation, but I do not believe this can be the
sole source of state authority to impose severe restrictions.
Coastal property may present such unique concerns for a
fragile land system that the State can go further in
regulating its development and use than the common law
of nuisance might otherwise permit."
Professor Epstein, in commenting on Justice Kennedy's statement,
believes that it first "underestimates the level of sophistication underlying
the common law analysis" and also argues that it "provides no insight into
the relative magnitude of the values at stake on both sides of the conflict."92 Epstein then makes his own evaluation:
As the total coastline subject to the regulation spans
approximately several hundred miles, a conservative
estimate suggests that billions of dollars in private use are
lost, with comparable losses in the tax base as well.
These private losses are, moreover, social losses in any

90. People ex rel. Alco Deree Co. v. City of Chicago, 118 N.E.2d 20, 25 (I1l. 1954).
91. 112 S. Ct. at 2903.
92. Epstein, supra note 83, at 1390.
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calculation that seeks to determine social welfare by
aggregating private welfare. ... The empirical question
imposed by my approach to the nuisance question is
whether there are any public benefits comparable to the
billions in private losses caused by placing a total, or even
partial, moratorium on the construction of ordinary singlefamily homes. I suspect that the social gains derived
from protecting the beachfront against erosion, or from
reducing the potential damage from hurricanes, could
amount to thousands or millions of dollars, but not the
billions of dollars of lost use value.93
Professor Epstein further states:
If, in a particular case, the net social benefits exceed the
private losses, there might be a case for regulation without
compensation. Such a case would suggest that the
intended use of the landowners was never included in the
initial bundle of private property rights. But given the
system of empirical evaluations implicit in any assignment
of property rights, it becomes permissible, if not necessary, to ask: Where are the billions in social benefits from
legislation that inflicts billions in private and social
losses? 94
This same type of reasoning might have been applied in First
English,95 where the legislation in question limited rebuilding of a campsite
because of the fears of flooding, which in turn raised fears of danger to the
life and safety of persons who might, in fact, occupy the site. If we are
computing costs, then suppose that the scenario to be analyzed is one which
is done in terms of the risk of life. In this case, one might argue that a
willing buyer and a willing seller would be prepared to run the risk of
building homes on the site purchased by Lucas even though it was believed

93. Id. at 1390-91. "When, for example, the legal system, invoking the concept of
'nuisance,' orders a person to discontinue some use of his land on the ground that it creates
less value than the decline that it brings about in the value of the surrounding land, the
defendant is not compensated. A legally coerced transaction is, therefore, less certain to
increase net happiness than a market transaction, because the misery of the (uncompensated)
losers may exceed the joy of the winners."
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 15 (4th ed. 1992).
94. Epstein, supra note 83 at 1390.
95. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
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that the site would be subject to hurricanes or to some other destructive
force from the ocean which would have some reasonable probability of
causing the destruction of the homes and, thereby, the taking of life. The
purchaser of such a home might be said to have paid a value commensurate
with the risk, and even to have taken into account the cost of insurance for
the value of the home and perhaps even additional life insurance. However,
the government looking at the same situation might conclude that the
potential risk to life is such that no houses should be built on the site, even
if the parties involved are willing to take the risk. It is not easy to quantify
monetarily the value of the lives that would be at risk.
In addition, the overall cost to society in regard to government having
to pay for such losses is a familiar experience. Floods, hurricanes, and
mudslides have caused vast destruction throughout the country. Prohibiting
persons from building in these locations helps to eliminate the cost to the
rest of society of having to subsidize the cost of rebuilding these homes.
Perhaps the problem lies in the requirement of assisting in the rebuilding
but, nevertheless, it is an existing reality brought about by government
acting through society's felt sense of compassion. In other words, in the
real world, all of society bears these losses, and it might be that the billions
6
of dollars in private loss is ultimately billions of dollars in public loss.
VI. DOLAN V. CITY OF TIGARD: 97 How MUCH IS ENOUGH?
GOVERNMENT EXACTIONS AND ECONOMIC HOOPS

In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,9 the Court addressed the
so-called "essential nexus" question. Nollan requires a determination as to
whether there is an "essential nexus" between the legitimate state interest and
the permit condition enacted by the city." The California Coastal Commission demanded a lateral public easement across the Nollans' beach-front lot in
exchange for a permit to demolish an existing bungalow and replace it with a
three-bedroom house."° The Coastal Commission had claimed that the
public easement condition was imposed to promote the legitimate state interest
of diminishing the "blockage of the view of the ocean" caused by construction
While the Supreme Court agreed that the Coastal
of the larger house.'
Commission's concern with protecting visual access to the ocean constituted

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See Epstein, supra note 83, at 1390-91.
114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994).
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
Id. at 836-37.
Id. at 828.
Id.
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a legitimate public interest, it could not see any nexus between visual access
to the ocean and a permit condition requiring later public access along the
Nollans' beachfront lot."° The Court concluded that the absence of a nexus
left the Coastal Commission in the position of simply trying to obtain an
easement through gimmickry, which converted a valid regulation of land use
into "'an out-and-out plan of extortion. "'1,3
In Dolan, the Supreme Court concluded that Tigard's conditions which
related to the prevention of flooding and the reduction of traffic congestion in
the central business district were the type of legitimate public purposes
previously upheld by the Court and would satisfy the "essential nexus" criteria
of Nollan.' 4 However, the Court expanded the takings concept found in
Nollan into a two-step analysis:
1.
2.

First, a court must determine whether an essential nexus exists
between a legitimate local governmental interest and the condition
for obtaining a permit.° 5
If such an "essential nexus" does exist, then the court must determine whether the condition imposed on the property owner and the
governmental interest bear a "rough proportionality" to each
other. 106

Florence Dolan, the owner of a plumbing and electrical supply store
located on Main Street in the central business district of Tigard, Oregon,
sought to expand her store from 9700 square feet on the eastern side of a 1.67acre parcel to 17,600 square feet and to pave a 39-space parking lot.'0 7 The
City Planning Commission required that Dolan dedicate a portion of her
property for improvement of a storm drainage system and that she dedicate an
additional 15-foot strip of land adjacent to the flood plain as a
pedestrian/bicycle pathway.'0 8 The Commission concluded that the flood
plain dedication was reasonably "related to the petitioner's request to intensify
the use of the site, given the increase in the impervious surface."' 9 The
Commission also found that the creation of a convenient, safe pedestrian/bicycle pathway system as an alternative means of transportation "could off

102.
103.
1981)).
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 838.
Id. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H.
114 S. Ct. at 2317.
Id.
Id. at 2319.
Id. at 2313.
Id. at 2314.
Id. at 2315.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

set some of the traffic demand on [nearby] streets and lessen the increase in
traffic congestion."" 0 These conditions furthered the City's Master Drainage Plan and the City's transportation study of the central business district,
both of which were adopted pursuant to the state of Oregon's requirement that
all Oregon cities adopt comprehensive land use plans consistent with statewide
planning goals."'
The Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, confirmed
that an "essential nexus" existed between "preventing flooding along Fanno2
Creek and limiting development within the creek's 100-year flood plain.""
The Court also concluded that the city's attempt to reduce traffic congestion
by providing for alternative means of transportation through the use of a
pedestrian/bicycle pathway provided a useful alternative means of transportation for workers and shoppers." 3 However, the second part of the new
standard required determining whether "the degree of the exactions demanded
by the city's permit conditions bear the required relationship to the projected
impact of petitioner's proposed development.''4
The Court first had to decide the required degree. The Court rejected
generalized statements as to the necessary connection between the required
dedication and the proposed development, stating that they seem to be simply
too lax." 5 On the other hand, the Court also rejected the "specific and
uniquely attributable" test enunciated by the Illinois Supreme Court." 6 The
Court also decided not to accept the "reasonable relationship" test adopted by
a majority of state courts because it thought the term was "confusingly similar"
to the term "rational basis" which describes the "minimal level of scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.""..7 The
Court then freshly minted the test called "rough proportionality." The Court
said of this test: "No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city
must make some sort of individualized determination that the required
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development."'1
It should be made clear that the burden under the Court's "rough
proportionality test" lies with the municipality to demonstrate that this test has
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2313.
112. Id.at 2318.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.at 2319.
116. See Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802
(11. 1961).
117. 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
118. Id.at 2319-20.
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been satisfied. The Court, in a footnote, comments upon Justice Stevens'
dissent criticizing the majority for putting the burden on the city:
He is correct in arguing that in evaluating most generally
applicable zoning regulations, the burden properly rests on
the party challenging the regulation to prove that it constitutes an arbitrary regulation of property rights.... Here, by
contrast, the city made an adjudicativedecision to condition
petitioner's application for a building permit on an individual parcel. In this situation, the burden properly rests on
the city." 9
What is or is not an adjudicated decision almost seems to be in the eye of
the beholder. In this case, the requirements related to a particular parcel of
land, as is the case in every land use application process. However, those
requirements were predicated upon comprehensive plans for the development
of the municipality which were necessitated by the State's requirement that the
municipality adopt a comprehensive land use management program, and these
master plans were most certainly legislative in nature. Simply applying the
legislation to the particular parcel of land could hardly be deemed "adjudicative" in a zoning context; otherwise, every decision related to the application
of a zoning ordinance could be deemed adjudicative and not legislative, which
is hardly the case. In other words, unless the Court was prepared to hold the
comprehensive plan which mandated the dedication to be unconstitutional, the
requirements imposed on Dolan simply flowed from the prior legislative determinations.
In any event, the burden of proof shifted to the city where the condition
involved required the property owner to dedicate the property in question. The
Court, in analyzing the evidence, stated: "The City has never said why a public
greenway, as opposed to a private one, was required in the interest of flood
control."'2 The Court further stated, "It is difficult to see why recreational
visitors trampling along petitioner's floodplain easement are sufficiently
related to the city's legitimate interest in reducing flooding problems along
Fanno Creek, and the city has not attempted to make any individualized
determination to support this part of its request."1'
The Court also concluded that finding the bicycle pathway system "could
offset some of the traffic demand" is very different from a finding that the
bicycle pathway "will" or is "likely to" offset additional traffic. While the
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 2320 n.8 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2320.
Id. at 2320-21.
114 S. Ct. at 2321-22 (emphasis added).
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Court states that no precise mathematical calculation is required, it concluded
that the city had to make "some effort to quantify its findings in support of the
statement
dedication for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the conclusory
23
that it could offset some of the traffic demand generated."
In his dissent, Justice Stevens raised issues which no doubt will be
explored in the future. He points out that the record does not reveal the "dollar
value of petitioner Florence Dolan's interest in excluding the public from the
greenway adjacent to her hardware business."'' The required dedication as
a condition of the approval would "provide her with benefits that may well go
beyond any advantage she gets from expanding her business."25 It could
not reasonably be presumed that the discretionary benefit that the city has
offered is less valuable than the property interest that Dolan can retain or
surrender at her option. 26
Further, Justice Stevens raises a critical issue important to developers as
well as local government. Almost all of the state court cases considered by the
majority involved challenges to "municipal ordinances requiring developers
to dedicate either a percentage of the entire parcel (usually seven or ten percent
of the platted subdivision) or an equivalent value in cash (usually a certain
dollar amount per lot) to help finance the construction of roads, utilities,
schools, parks and playgrounds."'127 The various state courts, including the
Illinois Supreme Court, have "not indicated that the transfer of an interest in
realty was any more objectionable than a cash payment."'128 Instead, the
29
courts uniformly examine the character of the entire economic transaction.'
Justice Stevens points out that the Court in Penn CentralCo. v. City of
New York" 30 stated that takings jurisprudence "does not divide a single parcel
into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
Stevens further argues that by
segment have been entirely abrogated.""
looking at only one aspect of the property owner's bundle of property rights
instead of the entire economic transaction, the majority in Dolan has lost the

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

114 S. Ct. at 2322 (emphasis added).
dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J.,
Id. at 2324.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966)).
Id.
438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
Id.
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proper focus in this type of case.'32 Stevens quotes a law review article
which states:
The subdivider is a manufacturer, processer, and marketer
of a product; land is but one of his raw materials. In
subdivision control disputes, the developer is not defending
hearth and home against the king's intrusion, but simply
attempting to maximize his profits from the sale of a
finished product. As applied to him, subdivision control
exactions are actually business regulations.' 33
It should be sufficient, according to the view adopted by the minority "'if
the municipality can demonstrate that its assessment of financial burdens
against subdividers is rational, impartial and conducive to fulfillment of
authorized planning objectives .... .""34
Since the property in Dolan was a flood plain and would simply be used
for detention purposes, Justice Stevens comments:
It seems likely that potential customers trampling along
petitioner's floodplain are more valuable than a useless
parcel of vacant land. Moreover, the duty to pay taxes and
the responsibility for potential tort liability may well make
ownership of the fee interest in useless land a liability rather
135
than an asset.
If one were to adopt the economic analysis in Lucas, one could well
conclude that in balancing the costs, Dolan would be in a superior position
("happier") if, in fact, she had dedicated the land as requested. Since the land
has no apparent value and may well subject her to liability, simply analyzing
the issue in terms of costs would suggest upholding the constitutionality. In
other words, there is no taking because Dolan is better off dedicating property
which is a liability to her.
While some commentators may make the comparison of the cost of the
exaction with its potential gain from getting the permit, in Dolan it is
necessary first to consider that given the water runoff created by the plaintiff's
expansion, she would, in fact, harm surrounding properties and would have to
make reasonable accommodation as to the drainage. Since the land in question
will be used to offset the drainage problem created by the construction,
yielding "title" serves as a benefit to the property owner in this particular case,
132.
133.
134.
135.

114 S. Ct. at 2325.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2326.
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and the comparison between the cost of the exaction and the gains obtainable
the cost of the
from getting a permit must first be modified by determining
36
exaction. In this case, it would be a negative cost.
CONCLUSION

The question of who bears the costs of public improvements has
historically not been answered by saying that the government must use public
funds for public improvements. Instead, those who are in fact creating or
exacerbating the need for the "public improvement" should bear the burden.
Overburdening the school systems or the road systems is in fact a "harm" to
the public at large.
Clearly, we have not heard the last from the United States Supreme Court
on the question of exactions. Given the narrow majority of this most recent
foray, and given the changing economic climate within local governments, it
may well be expected that there is much more to be said. One cannot help but
hark back to Justice Sutherland's words in Euclid:
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but
with the great increase in concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly are developing, which
require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions
in respect of the use and occupation of private lands in
urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity
and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are
so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century
ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been
rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are
sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for
reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations,
which, before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit
street railways, would have been condemned as fatally
arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties
[sic] never varies, the scope of their application must
expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions
which are constantly coming within the field of their
136. The rationale of the Illinois cases is that it is permissible under the police power
to require that the subdivision pay the costs of the burdens it has placed on municipal
facilities. See Robert H. Freilich and Peter S. Levi, Model Regulationsfor the Control of
Land Subdivision, 36 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1971). This rationale was confirmed in Krughoff v.
City of Naperville, 369 N.E.2d 892 (Il1. 1977).
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operation. In a changing
world, it is impossible that it
37
should be otherwise.1

137. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386-87.
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